FILED
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
8/23/2017 3:00 PM
BY SUSAN L. CARLSON
CLERK

Supreme Court No. 94785-6

No. 474978-1-I

COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION ONE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

THE MANDATORY POSTER AGENCY, INC., d/b/a CORPORATE RECORDS SERVICE, THE WASHINGTON LABOR LAW POSTER SERVICE, WASHINGTON FOOD SERVICE COMPLIANCE CENTER, and STEVEN J. FATA, THOMAS FATA, and JOSEPH FATA, individually and in their corporate capacity,

Petitioners

MEMORANDUM OF AMICI CURIAE L.A. INVESTORS, LLC, ET AL., IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

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(from State v. LA Investors, LLC, et al., Court of Appeals no. 48970-8-II)

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I. INTRODUCTION AND IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This memorandum is submitted on behalf of L.A. Investors, LLC, d/b/a Local Records Office ("LRO"), and Roberto and Laura Romero. In 2012 through 2016, LRO sent mailers to Washington residents who had recently purchased or refinanced real property. The mailer offered a product for purchase—a copy of the deed for the property and a customized "property profile." The mailer was plainly a solicitation and contained prominent disclosures and disclaimers.

The State sued LRO and the Romeros in Thurston County Superior Court under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, alleging the mailer was likely to mislead recipients to conclude it was a bill from a government agency. Both sides presented evidence on the issue of deceptiveness, and both sides moved for summary judgment. The court entered summary judgment in the State's favor and entered a judgment against LRO and the Romeros of over \$3.6 million in penalties, attorney's fees, and costs. Appx. B, C. LRO and the Romeros appealed, and their appeal is currently pending in the Court of Appeals, Division Two (Court of Appeals no. 48970-8-II; oral argument date: September 7, 2017).

The State filed this case, against The Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., *et al.*, seven months after filing suit against LRO and the Romeros.

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¹ State v. LA Investors, LLC, et al., Thurston County Superior Court no. 13-2-02286-6.

² The briefing filed in the Court of Appeals is available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/coaBriefs/index.cfm.

Among other things, the State alleges similarly that the defendants sent mailers that mimicked government forms. The pending appeal by LRO and the Romeros shares a common issue with this case: whether capacity to deceive, for purposes of proving an unfair or deceptive act or practice under RCW 19.86.020, is a question of fact where there is disputed evidence on deceptiveness or whether it is always a question of law. In both cases, the courts have held that the capacity of an advertisement or solicitation to deceive is always a question of law. See Appx. A (at 13-14), B.

Review is warranted because Division One's holding here is in conflict with other decisions of the Court of Appeals and with federal decisions, which are supposed to guide Washington courts in interpreting the CPA. RAP 13.4(b)(2). As amici curiae in this matter, LRO and the Romeros urge this Court to accept review and decide that capacity to deceive is not always a question of law but is instead a question of fact where disputed evidence is presented.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amici curiae rely upon the Petitioner's Statement of the Case.

III. **ARGUMENT**

Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act in 1914. Section 5 of the FTC Act declares unlawful all "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).3 Twenty-eight

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³ The FTC has authority to commence an administrative proceeding and enter an order to cease and desist or to commence a civil action for a penalty for violating the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (m).

states have enacted laws analogous to the FTC Act, commonly called "Little FTC Acts." Washington adopted its version, chapter 19.86 (the CPA), in 1961. The legislature stated its intent that the courts, in construing the CPA, "be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters[.]" RCW 19.86.920.

Before 1983, a communication was deceptive if it had "the tendency and capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the purchasing public." *Exposition Press, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961). In 1976, the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division Three, adopted that test. *Fisher v. World-Wide Trophy Outfitters, Ltd.*, 15 Wn. App. 742, 748, 551 P.2d 1398 (1976) ("To constitute a deceptive practice, the advertisement need only have a tendency or *capacity* to deceive a substantial portion of the purchasing public.") (citing *Exposition Press*). Soon after, also citing federal law, this Court adopted the test. *State v. Ralph Williams' Nw. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.*, 87 Wn.2d 298, 317, 553 P.2d 423 (1976) (citing *Vacu-Matic Carburetor Co. v. F.T.C.*, 157 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1946)); *see also Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemicals, Inc.*, 97 Wn.2d 753, 759, 649 P.2d 828 (1982) (citing *Fisher*, 15 Wn. App. at 748).

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⁴ The Court of Appeals in *Fisher* observed that the trial court's determination that the defendant's advertisements were deceptive was a finding of fact (deemed a verity as it was unchallenged on appeal). 15 Wn. App. at 748.

⁵ An unfair or deceptive act may be established in any of three ways. The State may establish that the defendant: (1) violated a statute the legislature has declared to be a per se violation of the CPA, (2) committed an act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest, or (3) committed an act or practice that has the capacity to (Footnote continued next page)

The FTC reworded the federal test in 1983, and the federal courts adopted the new phrasing. *F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp.*, 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing *Matter of Cliffdale Assocs.*, 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984) (incorporating *FTC Policy Statement on Deception* dated Oct. 14, 1983)). The test now evaluates whether a representation "is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances." *Id.* This Court adopted the rephrased federal test. *Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 166 Wn.2d 27, 50, 204 P.3d 885, 895 (2009) (analyzing whether "there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead' a reasonable consumer") (quoting *Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)). Capacity to deceive depends on the "net impression" a communication conveys to a reasonable consumer. *Id.* (quoting *F.T.C. v. Cyberspace.Com, LLC*, 453 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Under federal law, capacity to deceive has always been a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. *See, e.g., Kalwajtys v. F.T.C.*, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1956) ("The meaning of advertisements or other representations to the public, and their tendency or capacity to mislead or deceive, are questions of fact[.]"); *F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc.*, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1373 (D. Nev. 2014) ("[In] FTC enforcement actions involving advertisements, which judges are not trained to interpret, ...the "net impression" is generally a question of fact.") (citing *Nat'l Bakers Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir.1964)); *F.T.C. v. QT, Inc.*, 448 F.

deceive a substantial portion of the public. *Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank*, 176 Wn.2d 771, 787, 295 P.3d 1179 (2013). The first method of proof is not at issue.

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Supp. 2d 908, 957-58 (N.D. III. 2006), *aff'd*, 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The meaning of an advertisement, the claims or net impressions communicated to reasonable consumers, is a question of fact.").

Amici curiae agree with Petitioner that decisions of the Court of Appeals are in conflict as to whether capacity to deceive is presumptively a question of fact under Washington law. *See* Petition at 9-12. The Court of Appeals has previously held (in non-advertising cases) that capacity to deceive is a question of fact. *See, e.g., Holiday Resort Comm'ty Ass'n v. Echo Lake Assocs., LLC*, 134 Wn. App. 210, 226-27, 135 P.3d 499 (2006), *review denied*, 160 Wn.2d 1019 (2007); *Behnke v. Ahrens*, 172 Wn. App. 281, 292, 294 P.3d 729 (2012). In *Mandatory Poster*, the Court of Appeals has now held that, once the facts of the defendant's conduct are established, capacity to deceive is *always* a question of law. Slip op. at 9-11.

The Court of Appeals in *Mandatory Poster* acknowledged *Holiday Resort* and *Behnke*, but reasoned, "Those cases recognize only that the substantial portion of the public component of a deceptive act or practice may present a question of fact, not that a fact finder weighs whether a representation, omission, or practice is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer." Slip op. 11. But the phrase "substantial portion of the public" is not a separate "component" of the test for deceptiveness. In adopting the rephrased federal test, this Court recognized that "substantial

⁶ See also Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 982 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Carter Prods., Inc. v. F.T.C., 268 F.2d 461, 496 (9th Cir. 1959).

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 $^{^7}$ See also Walker v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 176 Wn. App. 294, 318, 308 P.3d 716 (2013).

portion of the public" simply meant, "reasonable consumer[s]." *Panag*, 166 Wn.2d at 50. In characterizing "substantial portion of the public" as a numerical inquiry, the Court of Appeals confuses the unfair-or-deceptive element of a CPA claim with the public-interest-impact element. *See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.*, 105 Wn.2d 778, 790, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).

To be sure, this Court has held in certain cases that "[w]hether undisputed conduct is unfair or deceptive is a question of law, not a question of fact." Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 181 Wn.2d 775, 786, 336 P.3d 1142 (2014) (citing *Panag*, 166 Wn.2d at 47; *Leingang v. Pierce* County Med. Bureau, Inc., 131 Wn.2d 133, 150, 930 P.2d 288 (1997)). But this Court has never extended that holding to cases involving *disputed* evidence on capacity to deceive. Indeed, this Court has recognized that a fact question may exist where deceptive statements are alleged. Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 Wn.2d 907, 921, 32 P.3d 250 (2001) (observing that "the jury was free to determine what could constitute an unfair and deceptive act or practice" where deceptive statements were alleged). Significantly, this Court has adopted a pattern jury instruction to guide juries tasked with determining, in civil-damage actions under the CPA, whether an act or practice "had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public." 6A WASH. PRAC., WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. 310.08 (6th ed., updated 2013).8

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⁸ See also D. DEWOLF, K. ALLEN, D. CARUSO, 25 WASH. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW & PRACTICE § 14:26 (3d ed., updated October 2016) ("Whether an act or practice is unfair (Footnote continued next page)

In some cases, a court can determine that "no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the solicitation was not likely to deceive consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances." *Cyberspace.Com*, 453 F.3d at 1201. But other cases may involve potentially disputed evidence, including "a survey 'of what consumers thought upon reading the advertisement in question," ... consumer testimony, expert opinion, and copy tests of ads." *Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C.*, 970 F.2d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1992). Treating capacity to deceive as necessarily a question of law means that in making its determination, a court cannot consider such evidence and must review only the allegedly deceptive communication itself. When a court decides a question of law, it does not assess credibility or weigh evidence; it may only apply legal principles to undisputed facts. *See Barker v. Advanced Silicon Materials, LLC*, 131 Wn. App. 616, 624, 128 P.3d 633 (2006).

The Court of Appeals' decision in *Mandatory Poster* illustrates the principal problem with eschewing evidence and determining deceptiveness as a question of law. The appellate court determined: "The CRS mass mailings are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer because the undisputed format, images, and content do *mimic government-related forms* and *create the net impression* that the recipient is obligated to return the form and pay \$125 to CRS." Slip op. at 13 (emphasis added). A

or deceptive is ordinarily a question for the fact finder.") (citing *Burbo v. Harley C. Douglass, Inc.*, 125 Wn. App. 684, 700, 106 P.3d 258 (2005) (citing *Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 144 Wn.2d 907, 921, 32 P.3d 250 (2001))).

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major premise of this determination is that "government-related forms" have a typical appearance, which the court evidently divined without considering extrinsic evidence.⁹ In addition, the court weighed the allegedly misleading language in the solicitation against clarifying disclosures to assess the "net impression" on reasonable consumers, without considering evidence on consumer behavior. Slip op. at 12-13. This Court's guidance is needed on whether issues should be decided based on evidence rather than legal analysis alone.

IV. CONCLUSION

Review by this Court is warranted because of the conflict between the Court of Appeals' decision here and the Court of Appeals' decisions in other cases, including *Holiday Resort* and *Behnke*. Amici curiae thus urge this Court to accept review under RAP 13.4(b)(2).

Respectfully submitted this **23**¹ day of August, 2017.

CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN, P.S.

 $\mathsf{By}_{\mathbf{\subseteq}}$

Jason W. Anderson, WSBA No. 30512 Attorneys for L.A. Investors, LLC, et al., Amici Curiae

⁹ Taking judicial notice of such a matter would not have been appropriate. See ER 201(b), (e).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that I am an employee at Carney Badley Spellman, P.S., over the age of 18 years, not a party to nor interested in the above-entitled action, and competent to be a witness herein. On the date stated below, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the below-listed attorney(s) of record by the method(s) noted:

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DATED this 23nd day of August, 2017.

Patti Saiden, Legal Assistant

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF THURSTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

SUPERIOR COURT NO. 13-2-02286-6

VS.

COURT OF APPEALS NO. 48970-8-II

LA INVESTORS LLC d/b/a

LOCAL RECORDS OFFICE and

ROBERTO ROMERO, a/k/a JUAN

ROBERTO ROMERO ASCENCION,

and LAURA ROMERO,

Defendant.

THE HONORABLE MARY SUE WILSON PRESIDING

Summary judgment hearing
Verbatim report of proceedings
February 12, 2016
2000 Lakeridge Drive SW, Building 2
Olympia, Washington

Ralph H. Beswick, Official Court Reporter Certificate No. 2023 1603 Evergreen Pk Ln SW Olympia, WA (360) 786-5568

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. Please be seated.

I'm going to take a moment to sign on here to our computer system, and then I'll call the case and have you introduce yourselves.

All right. So we are here for State of Washington v. LA Investors, cause number 13-2-02286-6. This is a continuation of the summary judgment hearing argument decision time from a few weeks ago when the court heard partial argument and hadn't rendered a decision and then the time scheduled for the pretrial conference.

Counsel, go ahead and introduce yourselves, please.

MR. NELSON: John A. Nelson, Your Honor, on behalf of the State of Washington.

MR. GILMAN: Tom Gilman on behalf of the defendants, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. So we're going to start with the court's decision. I want to get my papers in order. All right. So I told you that by today I would have a decision for you on the first piece of the competing motions for summary judgment in this case, and then depending on the outcome, I would hear argument on the remaining portions and we would proceed to talk about scheduling for trial.

So I understand that the issue before the court, the

first issue, is whether there's a Consumer Protection Act violation, and of course that's a three-part question, whether the conduct was in trade or commerce, whether the mailers here are unfair and deceptive, and whether the conduct affects the public interest. Most of the argument from a few weeks ago, January 15th, focussed on the question of whether the mailers are unfair and deceptive. I believe that there's really no dispute as to whether the mailers were part of trade and commerce, and if the mailers are unfair and deceptive whether the conduct affects the public interest.

So beginning with the question of whether the mailers are unfair or deceptive, what we have here is we have a mailer from a company that's labeled on the mailer as the Local Records Office owned by LA Investors, and it is directed to property owners, people who have recently purchased property and/or refinanced their property, and it purports to ask for a payment. The defense indicates that it is offering a product, and the State argues that it's intended to appear as a bill and not to be clear about what's being offered but to appear to look like it's a required payment connected with the recent purchase or refinance of property.

Ultimately, the question of whether this is an unfair or deceptive act requires the court to consider the following:

Whether an act is unfair requires the court to examine whether the act causes substantial injury, is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. A deceptive act is one that is narrower than that broad statement of unfair practice, and it is an act that has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. The factors that the court considers in evaluating the question is to broadly construe the Consumer Protection Act to protect consumers, to facilitate or promote the purposes of the Consumer Protection Act which is so that consumers know what they are buying and understand the terms on which they are buying a product or service.

In this state the courts are guided by federal court decisions in interpreting and applying the Consumer Protection Act and in answering the question of whether the particular act, in this case the mailer from Local Records Office, has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. And that question is a question of law for the court. The court considers this from the perspective of the least sophisticated reader and considers the net impression of the entire communication, which means that even if some aspects or information on the communication are truthful, the question of whether the mailer has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public is

determined by the net impression of the entire communication. Disclaimers may cure any communication or may be factored in, but the court understands that it depends upon the net impression of the entire communication, taking into account the disclaimers in the context and the manner that they are presented on the mailer.

In analyzing this case the court considered all of the cases that the parties cited and found some cases of particular help to the court, and I'll mention those and summarize what I take away from those cases. The Panang case, a 2009 State Supreme Court case, involved tort claims that were presented as debts that were owing. The target audience were individuals who had outstanding claims, and the communication had the capacity to lead the recipient to think that he had a debt that was owing when the debt had not been reduced to an absolute debt payment, or a debt obligation.

FTC versus Commerce Planet is a federal case from 2012. This was an on-line internet advertisement where the supplier offered a free startup kit for on-line selling, and if the purchaser signed up for the free startup kit, if the purchaser did not cancel within a period of time, he or she would incur monthly charges. The third version of this advertisement removed the free startup kit offer and the

company saw a severe downward spike in sales. court's evaluation of the net impression of this communication the court noted that initial communications had prominent features that were designed to make the consumer think that the consumer was getting the startup kit, period, and was not incurring any subsequent obligation. The information revealing the monthly charge if there wasn't a cancellation was not particularly prominent in the setting of the internet. It was not in the first couple of pages, including on the landing page, so it wasn't included in the early screens that a buyer or a consumer would notice. Ultimately, the court found that the solicitation had the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public, and the court noted that deceptive can be either a representation or an omission, and the question for the court is whether the communication is likely to mislead the reasonable consumer, and the topic that is presented is material if it would likely affect the consumer's choice. And ultimately the court found important, I believe, the fact that with the removal of the free startup kit there was much less interest which indicated that the presentation of the information was critical to the net impression and the ultimate conclusion that it was deceptive.

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I also found FTC versus Cyberspace, a Ninth Circuit case

from 2006, helpful. There was a mailer for internet services. It presented itself as looking like a rebate check, and on the back of the check it indicated if the check was cashed, the consumer would be signing up for a monthly internet service that would be added to their phone bill. And this consequence was located, as I said, on the back of the check in small print. The court found the net impression of the mailing was that it was a refund or a rebate, not an offer for services, and of importance to the court was that the mailer and the check had the recipient's name and phone number on it, and it left the impression of inviting the consumer to cash the check, and it was intended to obligate the consumer for services without the consumer knowing the true effect of cashing the check.

Finally, an older case from the Ninth Circuit, 1969,

Floersheim versus FTC. Here there were creditor forms that
were sent to debtors to secure information, and the return
address was Washington D.C. The design of the forms and
the font and the terminology and the reference to
Washington D.C. were all considered as part of the overall
communication that the court concluded had its purpose of
deceiving the debtor and leaving the impression that the
form was from the government and the recipients of the
communication were required to respond.

So looking at the communication in this case we have an

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envelope, and then we have a two-page document that comes in the envelope, and each party makes a number of arguments including supporting materials from members of the public and from experts. The arguments on behalf of the State are as follows: In summary, the Court understands the arguments to be that the content and presentation of the mailer should be examined as a whole and the notation that the mailer is from a company called Local Records Office combined with its Olympia mailing address from the State's perspective is designed to make the communication look like it's from a government office coming from the state capital with a name like "local" and "office," that there is specific information both on the envelope and on the mailer itself that has information specific to the recipient, name, address, property information, property transfer date, the timing of the mailer corresponding within a few weeks of a recent property purchase, the fact that the document in the middle of the first page says boldly "county public information," suggesting this is from a county office, the indication that this is a bill associated with a property transaction by having a "please respond" with a deadline date, even though the deadline doesn't mean anything according to the company, and then the payment stub that appears to look like a billing payment stub and lists what is being collected as a service fee.

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All of these things together, from the State's perspective, indicate that the content and presentation as a whole make this appear to be a statement from a government office connected to the recent property transaction that the consumer is required to respond to and The State argues that the disclaimers are ineffective when considered in the context of the rest of the document. The State points to the actual response out of 215,000 or so mailers, 8,000 consumers purchased the product, and indicates that that is a high rate of return, about two times or more the typical return for a service or product offered in this manner. The State offers a number of declarations from consumers who describe that they believed they were required to respond and pay this amount, and the State describes these actual people who were "duped," in the State's word, as many who have higher education degrees and might be considered as more sophisticated than the least sophisticated consumer. The State points out that the target audience was designed to get the attention of recent home purchasers and refinancers, indicating that it was timed so that the audience would believe it was connected to the property purchase or refinance.

The first round of mailers included a statement in the top right-hand corner of the first page that referenced

that the record you were receiving is "in the county where your property is located in for up to \$89," referencing or intended to leave the impression that this purchase was in the same cost range as what one would purchase from a county office, and the State offers evidence that all local offices either provide copies of deeds for free or at a nominal cost that doesn't come anywhere near \$89. The court understands that sometime in 2013 that reference was eliminated from the communication. Then ultimately the State offers the expert Mr. Pratkanis who from the court's perspective summarizes much of the information that I've just recounted and offers the conclusion that the communication is deceptive and designed to be misleading to the average consumer and also offers opinions regarding the response rate being particularly high.

The defense argues that the disclaimers here are effective, that they are in capital letters, that they are prominently placed on the document, that the content of the disclaimers say repeatedly "This is not a government document." The court counts four different places on the mailing that indicates that "This is not a government document." On the envelope in capital letters underneath a mail tampering warning the mailer indicates "This is not a government document." On the top of the first page of the mailing there is a box with a square round rectangle around

it in all caps and it indicates "This service to obtain a copy of your deed or other record of title is not associated with any governmental agency," and then near the bottom of the first page before the mail stub in smaller capital letters is another paragraph that says a couple of times "Local Records Office is not affiliated with the county in which your deed is filed in, nor affiliated with any government agencies. This offer serves as a soliciting for services and not to be interpreted as bill due. product or service has not been approved or endorsed by any governmental agency, and this offer is not being made by an agency of government. This is not a bill. This is a solicitation. You are under no obligation to pay the amount stated unless you accept this offer. Local Records Office operates in accordance with both business and professions code" -- with a number.

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And then on the final page, which I will call the fine print reference to a number of seemingly definitions of terms used in property transactions, the last couple of paragraphs are headed by the word "disclaimer," and again says Local Records Office is not affiliated with any state or the United States or the county records, with some additional detail there.

So the defense argues that the content of these disclaimers, the numbers of these disclaimers, their

placement, their use of capital letters, all serve to make this communication truthful and not deceptive. The defense also argues that the actual name of the company, Local Records Office, is not referencing a state or county agency, that there are no seals, and that the typical consumer would know the names of the local county and the local county agency or state agencies that would be involved in property transactions, and without seals this document, according to the defense, does not look like an official government record. Defense also argues that "respond promptly" in several places or "please respond by" in several places on the mailing is not the same or the equivalent as a payment-due or bill-due statement. And the defense also argues that there is not a substantial portion of complainers about this, that the number of people who asked for their money back was less than one hundred out of the 215,000 or so mailers, or less than one hundred out of 8,000 or so purchasers, and the defense argues that that is a very low complaint rate, which they offer their expert Bruno in part to suggest that that should be an indicator that this mailer does not have a capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.

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Ultimately, having reviewed this question and deliberated over it for some time and determining that the question is a question of law for the court and applying

the principles that I outlined at the outset, I am finding that on summary judgment that this mailer does have the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. I have made this determination considering the mailer from the perspective of the least sophisticated reader considering the net impression of the entire communication. Even though some information is truthful and is offered with an attempt to indicate that this is not from a government agency, I do find that the disclaimers here, when considered with the overall net impression, are not effective to support a different conclusion.

I find this both for the mailer in its form when it referenced the \$89 in the top right-hand box of the first page of the inside piece of paper, and after. I think the overall net impression in both situations is that it has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public. I find that based upon -- I am not going to recite everything I already identified I fear, but I will indicate that this is looking at the overall content and presentation, that that combined with the targeted audience, with the recipients having been recent purchasers or refinancers, with a name of a company combined with the capital of the state, the company Local Records Office, an unsophisticated or a least sophisticated consumer could easily think that that is the name of their local records

office.

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While the court and the lawyers in the courtroom would know or be expected to know that it's not from Thurston County and that there isn't a county agency named Local Records Office, the court does not think that the least sophisticated consumer would likely know and appreciate what the names of state agencies or county agencies are. So the name of the company combined with the return address being Olympia and the combination of the document having specific information about the person who has recently purchased or refinanced, the date of that purchase and refinance, a property identification number, and specific information about the sale amount, a deadline, and the overall presentation of "please respond by" and a service fee, the court finds that this mailer has the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public, and for all those reasons the court is prepared today to rule as a matter of law that these mailers represent unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the Consumer Protection Act.

As I alluded to earlier, it's my impression that this was the most significant issue, but as to the other two issues supporting a conclusion of a Consumer Protection Act violation, the question of whether the defendants are engaged in trade or commerce seems to be an easy conclusion

for the court as these mailers were directed at over 200,000 consumers in the state of Washington and the company set up a mailing office in Olympia, Washington, and intended to sell its service or product to Washington consumers.

And does the defendant's conduct affect the public interest. These acts were committed in the course of the defendant's business. 215,000 or so mailings do represent a pattern or generalized course of conduct. This makes the acts repeated, and as I understand it the company continues to send out these mailings and has been sending these mailings out for three or more years so there's a real and substantial potential for repetition, and for these reasons the court finds that the conduct does affect the public interest.

So Mr. Nelson, you tell me what kind of a written ruling we need at this juncture to reflect the court's decision. I know that your proposed order, of course, did not have that much detail. What I am prepared to do at this time is to hear argument from counsel on the issues that you didn't present argument on January 15th, and those were in the State's brief, and those were whether injunctive relief is appropriate on summary judgment, restitution and civil penalties on summary judgment, and as I understand the motion for summary judgment from the State, asks for a

determination that attorney's fees are appropriate but did not specifically advance any specific amount. So I would like to hear from the parties on whether injunctive relief, restitution and civil penalties are appropriately addressed on summary judgment at this juncture.

Mr. Nelson, if you're ready to go forward on that, I would hear from you.

MR. NELSON: I am, Your Honor. If I could have one question with regard to clarity. As part of your ruling does your ruling find that the individual defendants are individually liable for their wrongdoing under the Consumer Protection Act or would you require further briefing on that issue, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I would like you to address that. I did read the briefing. I meant to address that up front. I meant to have asked you up front to include that in your remarks. I will note that in your opening brief,

Mr. Nelson, in your introduction you had asked for injunctive relief, but in the content of the briefing section I didn't find a section devoted to injunctive relief. So it would be helpful if you address whether we're ready for that relief at this time, and of course opposing counsel can address whether or not it's time or appropriate to address that at this time.

MR. NELSON: Your Honor, from the State's

APPENDIX B

2016 FEB 12 PM 4: 37

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__EXPEDITE
__No hearing set
X Hearing Set
Date: 12/18/15
Time: 9:00 a.m.

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Judge/Calendar: Hon. Mary Sue Wilson

13 – 2 – 02286 – 6 ORGSJ Order Granting Summary Judgment 118568

STATE OF WASHINGTON THURSTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

V

LA INVESTORS, LLC, d/b/a LOCAL RECORDS OFFICE; and ROBERTO ROMERO, a/k/a JUAN ROBERTO ROMERO ASCENCIO, individually and as a Member and Manager of LA INVESTORS, LLC, and on behalf of the marital community comprised of Roberto Romero and Laura Romero; and LAURA ROMERO, individually and as a Member and Manager of LA INVESTORS, LLC and on behalf of the marital community comprised of Roberto Romero and Laura Romero.

NO. 13-2-02286-6

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'
STATE OF WASHINGTON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[PROPOSED]

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Defendants.

This matter, having come before the Court on the State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court having heard the arguments, if any, of the parties, and considered the following material:

- 1. Declaration of John Nelson and exhibits attached thereto;
- 2. Declaration of Anthony Pratkanis and exhibits attached thereto;
- 3. Declaration of Lesli Ashley and exhibits attached thereto;

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ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON Consumer Protection Division 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7745

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1	4.	Declaration of Asta Margaryan;	
2	. 5.	Declaration of Jennifer Richter;	
3	6.	Declaration of Melanie Muzatko;	
4	7.	Declaration of Jason Bernstein;	
5	8.	Declaration of Daniel Bohm;	
. 6	9.	Declaration of Margriet Denny;	
7	10.	Declaration of Mireya Espindola;	
8	11.	Declaration of Della Hallengren;	
9	12.	Declaration of Lindri Henegar;	
10	13.	Declaration of Michael Kennedy;	
11	14.	Declaration of Erika Ludwig;	
12	15.	Declaration of Vitaliy Marchenko;	
13	16.	Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall;	
14	17.	Declaration of Lindsey Miller;	
15	18.	Declaration of Athena Osborn;	
16	19.	Declaration of Ingrid Parker;	
17	20.	Declaration of Matthew Parker;	
18	21.	Declaration of Krista Richardson;	
19	22.	Declaration of Angela Romano;	
20	23.	Declaration of Pablo Sala;	
21	24.	Declaration of Susan Sauer;	
22	25.	Declaration of Theodore Smith;	
23	26.	Declaration of Jennifer Snowden;	
24	27.	Declaration of Howard Stambor;	
25	28.	Declaration of James Touhey;	
26	29.	Declaration of Ingrid Troy;	
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pay. Defendants' solicitation had the capacity to deceive a substantial number of Washington consumers.

- 4. Defendants were engaged in trade and commerce as they sent 215,304 deceptive solicitations to Washington consumers and 7,985 Washington consumers were deceived into purchasing the product, between July 2012 and July 2015.

 This amounts to, at a minimum, 215,304 Violations
- 5. Defendants' acts affected the public interest. The unfair and deceptive acts were committed in the course of Defendants' business, there was there a pattern or generalized course of conduct, the acts were repeated, and many consumers were affected or likely to be affected.
- 6. Individuals, including corporate officers, may be personally liable for conduct that violates the CPA if he or she "participate[d] in" or "with knowledge approve[d] of" the practice that violates the CPA. State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 298, 322, 553 P.2d 423 (1976).
- 7. The individual Defendants, Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto Romero Ascencio and Laura Romero, are found personally liable for the conduct that violates the CPA described herein. Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto Romero Ascencio and Laura Romero are the sole members and managers of LA Investors, ELC and have been directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the business from inception to the present. Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto Romero Ascencio and Laura Romero participated in the design and approval of the deceptive mailing.
- 8. In determining the appropriate amount for a civil penalty, the Court finds that Defendants repeatedly committed the same violations of the CPA through transactions with thousands of consumers in Washington. Defendants did not act in good faith. The acts and practices described herein were not isolated instances of misjudgment, but rather, an intentional and deliberate practice. Defendants' violations caused substantial injury to the public.

Consumer restitution is ordered in an amount to be determined later.

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Consumer Protection Division
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7745

of the consumer protection Act.
(2CW 19.86)

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Defendants, as well as their successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED, pursuant to RCW 19.86.080(1) from:

- 1. Engaging in acts or practices that violate the CPA in the solicitation of or transactions with Washington consumers;
 - 2. Engaging in any other acts or practices that violate the CPA;
- 3. Failing to ensure that all their successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them receive a copy of this Order.

The Court ORDERS that Defendants shall jointly and severally pay:

An amount equal to all fees received from (and not previously refunded to) the Washington consumers that responded to the Defendants' solicitation.

- a. Defendants shall identify all fees received from (and not previously refunded to) the Washington consumers that responded to the Defendants' solicitation to the State and the Court on or before January ______, 2016. Defendants shall also provide to the State on or before January ______, 2016, a list of all its past and present Washington consumers, most recent contact information for those consumers, and the amount of all un-refunded amounts received from each consumer, in order to facilitate distribution of this restitution payment, which is ordered pursuant to RCW 19.86.080.
- b. The State shall submit a proposed method to administer the restitution payments to the Court by January ____, 2016. Any objection shall be submitted by January ____, 2016, and any response shall be submitted by February ____, 2016. The Court will determine the method to administer the restitution payments without oral argument unless it notifies the parties.
 - c. Defendants shall bear all costs for the administration of the restitution

ments. Civil penaltics in an amount

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
Consumer Protection Division
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7745

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ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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1	2. \$2,776,745 in civil penalties to the State of Washington pursuant
2	to RCW 19.86.140. This amount is based on a penalty of \$89 for each of Defendants' 7,895
3	deceived paying customers (\$702,695) and a penalty of \$10 per mailing for those deceptive
4	solicitations that did not result in a purchase (\$2,074,090).
5	3. The State's reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The State shall submit its costs
6	and fees to the Court by January 2016. Any objection shall be submitted by January,
7	2016, and any response shall be submitted by February 11, 2016. The Court will determine
8	the award of costs and attorney's fees without oral argument unless it notifies the parties.
9	4. These amounts shall be paid to the State of Washington by check made payable
10	to "Attorney General-State of Washington" and sent to the Office of the Attorney General,
11	Attention: Cynthia Lockridge, Administrative Office Manager, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000,
12	Seattle, Washington 98104-3188.
13	DATED this 12 day of tebruary ,2015.
14	DATED this 12th day of February ,2015. May AL 21
15	THE HONORABLE JUDGE MARY SUE WILSON
16	Presented by:
17	ROBERT W. FERGUSON
8	Attorney General
9	
20	JOHN NELSON, WSBA #45724 Assistant Attorney General
21	Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Washington
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APPENDIX C

FILED SUPERIOR COURT THURSTON COUNTY, WA

2016 MAY -3 PM 3: 03

Linda Myhre Enlow Thurston County Clerk 13-2-02286-6 JD

Judgment 226726

> STATE OF WASHINGTON THURSTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

NO. 13-2-02286-6

PROPOSED

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JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF WASHINGTON

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LA INVESTORS, LLC, d/b/a LOCAL RECORDS OFFICE; and ROBERTO

ROMERO, a/k/a JUAN ROBERTO 13 ROMERO ASCENCIO, individually and

as a Member and Manager of LA 14

INVESTORS, LLC, and on behalf of the marital community comprised of Roberto 15

Romero and Laura Romero; and LAURA ROMERO, individually and as 16

a Member and Manager of LA

INVESTORS, LLC, and on behalf of the 17 marital community comprised of Roberto

Romero and Laura Romero, 18

Defendants.

T. JUDGMENT SUMMARY

1.1 Judgment Creditor: State of Washington

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1.2 Judgment Debtors:

LA Investors, LLC, d/b/a Local Records Office, and Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan

Roberto Romero Ascencio, jointly and

severally.

1.3 Principal Judgment Amount:

a) Civil Penalties:

\$2,569,980.00

JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF WASHINGTON - 1

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON Consumer Protection Division 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7745

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_	. b)	Restitution:	\$856,981.00
2	c)	Costs & Attorneys' Fees:	\$176,806.73
3	d)	Total Judgment:	\$3,603,767.73
4	1.4	Post Judgment Interest Rate	12% per annum
5 6	1.5	Attorneys for Judgment Creditor:	John Nelson
7	1.6	Attorneys for Judgment Debtors:	Assistant Attorney General Thomas Gilman Barrett & Gilman
9			
10	II. DEFINITIONS		
11	For the purpose of this Judgment, the term "Defendants" shall include only Defendants		
12	LA Investors, LLC, d/b/a Local Records Office and Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto		
13	Romero Ascencio.		
14	III. JUDGMENT		
	This matter, having come before the Court on the State of Washington's Motion for		
15	Summary Judgment, and the Court having heard the arguments of the parties, and considered		
16	the following	material:	
17	1.	Declaration of John Nelson and	exhibits attached thereto;
18	2.	Declaration of Anthony Pratkani	s and exhibits attached thereto;
19	3.	Declaration of Lesli Ashley and	exhibits attached thereto;
20	4.	Declaration of Asta Margaryan;	
21	5.	Declaration of Jennifer Richter;	•
22	6.	Declaration of Melanie Muzatko	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
23	7.	Declaration of Jason Bernstein;	
24	8.	Declaration of Daniel Bohm;	
25	9.	Declaration of Margriet Denny;	
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11. Declaration of Della Hallengren; 12. Declaration of Lindri Henegar; 13. Declaration of Michael Kennedy; 14. Declaration of Erika Ludwig; 15. Declaration of Grenka Ludwig; 16. Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall 17. Declaration of Lindsey Miller; 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 10. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 11. 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13. 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14. 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15. 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16. 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17. 26. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 18. 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19. 28. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 29. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 21. Declaration of Grand Willits; 22. 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment; 24. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment;	1	10.	Declaration of Mireya Espindola;
13. Declaration of Michael Kennedy; 14. Declaration of Erika Ludwig; 15. Declaration of Vitaliy Marchenko; 16. Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall 17. Declaration of Lindsey Miller; 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 10. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 11. 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13. 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14. 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15. 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16. 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17. 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18. 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19. 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21. 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22. 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	2	11.	Declaration of Della Hallengren;
14. Declaration of Erika Ludwig; 15. Declaration of Vitaliy Marchenko; 16. Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall 17. Declaration of Lindsey Miller; 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 10. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 11. 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12. 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13. 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14. 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15. 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16. 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17. 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18. 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19. 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20. 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21. 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22. 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	3	12.	Declaration of Lindri Henegar;
15. Declaration of Vitaliy Marchenko; 16. Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall 17. Declaration of Lindsey Miller; 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 11. 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12. 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13. 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14. 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15. 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16. 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17. 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18. 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19. 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20. 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21. 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22. 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	4	13.	Declaration of Michael Kennedy;
16. Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall 17. Declaration of Lindsey Miller; 9 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 10 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 11 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	5	14.	Declaration of Erika Ludwig;
17. Declaration of Lindsey Miller; 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 11. 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12. 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13. 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14. 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15. 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16. 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17. 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18. 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19. 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20. 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21. 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22. 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	6	. 15.	Declaration of Vitaliy Marchenko;
9 18. Declaration of Athena Osborn; 10 19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 11 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	7	16.	Declaration of Gwendelyn Marshall
19. Declaration of Ingrid Parker; 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	8	17.	Declaration of Lindsey Miller;
11 20. Declaration of Matthew Parker; 12 21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 13 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 14 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	9	18.	Declaration of Athena Osborn;
21. Declaration of Krista Richardson; 22. Declaration of Angela Romano; 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	10	19.	Declaration of Ingrid Parker;
22. Declaration of Angela Romano; Declaration of Pablo Sala; Declaration of Susan Sauer; Declaration of Theodore Smith; Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; Declaration of Howard Stambor; Declaration of James Touhey; Declaration of Ingrid Troy; Declaration of Gerald Willits; Declaration of Kyoko Wright; State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	11	20.	Declaration of Matthew Parker;
14 23. Declaration of Pablo Sala; 15 24. Declaration of Susan Sauer; 16 25. Declaration of Theodore Smith; 17 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 18 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 19 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 20 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	12	21.	Declaration of Krista Richardson;
Declaration of Susan Sauer; Declaration of Theodore Smith; Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; Declaration of Howard Stambor; Declaration of James Touhey; Declaration of Ingrid Troy; Declaration of Gerald Willits; Declaration of Kyoko Wright; State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	13	22.	Declaration of Angela Romano;
Declaration of Theodore Smith; 26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	14	23.	Declaration of Pablo Sala;
26. Declaration of Jennifer Snowden; 27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	15	24.	Declaration of Susan Sauer;
27. Declaration of Howard Stambor; 28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	16	25.	Declaration of Theodore Smith;
28. Declaration of James Touhey; 29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	17	26.	Declaration of Jennifer Snowden;
29. Declaration of Ingrid Troy; 21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	18	27.	Declaration of Howard Stambor;
21 30. Declaration of Gerald Willits; 22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	19	28.	Declaration of James Touhey;
22 31. Declaration of Kyoko Wright; 23 32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	20	29.	Declaration of Ingrid Troy;
32. State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;	21	30.	Declaration of Gerald Willits;
	22	31.	Declaration of Kyoko Wright;
24 33. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment;	23	32.	State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment;
	24	33.	Defendants' Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment;
25 34. Declaration of Thomas L. Gilman in Support of Defendants' Response in	25	34.	Declaration of Thomas L. Gilman in Support of Defendants' Response in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto;	26		Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto;

1	35.	Declaration of Albert V. Bruno in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial	
2	·	Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto;	
3	36.	Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment;	
4	37.	Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;	
5	38.	Declaration of Thomas L. Gilman in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial	
6		Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto;	
7	. 39.	Plaintiff's Response [to] Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment;	
8	40.	Declaration of Rebecca Hartsock and exhibits thereto;	
9	41.	Supplemental Declaration of John Nelson in Support of Plaintiff's Response to	
10		Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto;	
11	42.	Second Supplemental Declaration of John Nelson in Support of Plaintiff's	
12		Response to Motion for Summary Judgment;	
13	43.	Declaration of Thomas L. Gilman in Strict Reply in Support of Motion for	
14		Partial Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto;	
15	44.	Defendants' Strict Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;	
16	45.	State of Washington's Motion for Costs and Fees;	
17	46.	Declaration of Thomas L. Gilman in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Fees	
18		and Costs and exhibits thereto dated March 2, 2016; and	
19	47.	Declaration of Thomas L. Gilman dated March 8, 2016, and exhibits thereto.	
20	The C	Court hereby restates and incorporates by reference its February 12, 2016 Order	
21	Granting in P	art Plaintiff State of Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying	
22	Defendants' N	Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Having determined that there is no just	
23	reason for delay in the entry of a final judgment against Defendants, and being fully advised,		
24	the Court here	eby makes and enters the following:	
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26			

- (3) that affects the public interest. State v. Kaiser, 161 Wn. App. 705, 719, 254 P.3d 850 (2001); see also Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1985). Whether a particular act is unfair or deceptive is a question of law. See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 47, 204 P.3d 885 (2009).
- 5.6 Defendants' conduct as described in the Findings of Fact above constitutes violations of the Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, Defendants sent at least 256,998 deceptive solicitations to Washington consumers between June 2012 and February 2016. Each version of this solicitation was deceptive and created the net impression that it came from a government agency or was a bill that consumers were otherwise obligated to pay. In sending these deceptive solicitations, Defendants violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act.
- 5.7 Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment ordering Defendants to pay a civil penalty for each violation of the Consumer Protection Act, pursuant to RCW 19.86.140.
- 5.8 Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree ordering Defendants to pay restitution to consumers pursuant to RCW 19.86.080.
- 5.9 Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree binding upon Defendants and their successors, officers, employees, agents, servants, transferees, directors, and all persons in active concert or participation with Defendants permanently enjoining Defendants from engaging in the practices violating the Consumer Protection Act as described above and requiring Defendants to comply with the injunctive relief outlined below.
- 5.10 Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree ordering Defendants to pay Plaintiff's costs and fees incurred in the prosecution of this action pursuant to RCW 19.86.080.
- 5.11 The fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in the prosecution of this action are reasonable.
- 5.12 Individuals, including corporate officers, may be personally liable for conduct that violates the CPA if he or she "participate[d] in" or "with knowledge approve[d] of" the

INJUNCTION

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Defendants, as well as their successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED, pursuant to RCW 19.86.080(1) from:

- 1) Engaging in acts or practices that violate the CPA in the solicitation of or transactions with Washington consumers;
 - 2) Engaging in any other acts or practices that violate the CPA; and
- 3) Failing to ensure that all their successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them receive a copy of this Order.
- 6.2 The injunctive provisions of this Judgment shall apply to Defendants and Defendants' successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, and all other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants.
- 6.3 Within seven (7) days following the entry of this Judgment, Defendants shall inform all successors, assigns, transferees, officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, and all other persons or entities in active concert or participation with Defendants or with the business entities named as Defendants in the Complaint of the terms and conditions of this Judgment and shall direct those persons and/or entities to comply with this Judgment.

CIVIL PENALTIES

- 6.4 The Court orders Defendants LA Investors, LLC, and Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto Romero Ascencio, to jointly and severally pay a civil penalty to the State in the amount of \$2,569,980 pursuant to RCW 19.86.140. This amount is based on a penalty of \$10 for each of Defendants' 256,998 deceptive solicitations sent to Washington consumers between June 2012 and February 2016.
- 6.5 In determining the appropriate amount for a civil penalty, the Court finds that Defendants repeatedly committed the same violations of the CPA through transactions with

thousands of consumers in Washington. This civil penalty will eliminate any benefits derived by the Defendants from their deceptive practices, and also will vindicate the authority of the Consumer Protection Act to protect Washington consumers from unfair and deceptive acts.

6.6 In assessing the appropriate amount of civil penalties, the Court also finds that Defendants LA Investors, LLC, and Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto Romero Ascencio, acted in bad faith. The acts and practices described herein were not isolated instances of misjudgment, but rather, an intentional and deliberate practice perpetuated between June 2012 and February 2016. Defendants' violations caused substantial injury to the public and as early as 2013 Defendants were put on notice by Plaintiff that the Local Records Office solicitation had the capacity to deceive. Defendants nevertheless continued to disseminate thousands of solicitations in Washington.

RESTITUTION

- 6.7 The Court orders Defendants LA Investors, LLC, and Roberto Romero, a/k/a Juan Roberto Romero Ascencio, to jointly and severally pay pursuant to RCW 19.86.080(2), restitution in an amount equal to all fees received from (and not previously refunded to) any and all Washington consumers who responded to Defendants' solicitations sent between June 1, 2012, and February 12, 2016. Defendants shall bear all costs for the administration of the restitution payments. In no event shall any costs associated with payment of restitution fall to Plaintiff. In the event that any amount designated as restitution is rejected by an eligible consumer or remains otherwise unpaid as provided in this Judgment, such monies shall revert to Defendants after Defendants have paid all third party claims administrator costs and all monies related to consumer restitution.
 - 6.8 The Court orders that restitution shall be administered as follows.
- 6.9 Within 45 days of the Entry of this Judgment, Defendants must retain a nationally recognized claims administrator to operate the claims process. Defendants are required to receive approval from the State before retaining the claims administrator, which shall not be

unreasonably withheld. The parties shall then file a motion for approval of the claims administrator with the Court.

- 6.10 Defendants are responsible for all costs and fees associated with retaining the nationally recognized claims administrator.
- 6.11 Within 10 days of the Court's entry of approval of the claims administrator, Defendants must transmit the full amount of restitution, \$856,981, to be held in trust by the claims administrator (the "Restitution Fund"). The amount of restitution is calculated by reducing the number of Washington consumers who remitted payment in response to Defendants' solicitation (9,695) by 66 (those who were issued refunds). Therefore, the amount of restitution is \$856,981 (9,629 x \$89). Defendants shall have no interest, right, title, ownership, privilege or incident of ownership, or authority in regard to the Restitution Fund and shall have no right to alter, amend, revoke or terminate the Restitution Fund. The claims administrator is not authorized to pay or distribute any money from the Restitution Fund unless specifically authorized by this Judgment or a later order of the Court.
- 6.12 Within 10 days of the Court's entry of approval of the claims administrator, Defendants must provide the claims administrator and the State a current, verified list of all Washington consumers who purchased Defendants' product along with a list of those that have received a refund and the amount of the refund. Washington consumers will be eligible to receive restitution in the amount of the difference between the amount they paid and any refund they received from Defendants.
- 6.13 For the entire period of the restitution payment process, the claims administrator shall maintain a website with the terms and conditions of this Judgment. The website must be in both English and Spanish.
- 6.14 For the entire period of the restitution payment process, the claims administrator will offer a 1-800 number whereby consumers can call to receive more information regarding the

restitution mechanism. The 1-800 number must have operators available to assist consumers in English and Spanish.

- 6.15 The claims administrator shall verify all addresses on Defendants' customer list that will be used for restitution through a nationally recognized third-party vendor. This must be completed within 40 days of the Court's entry of approval of the claims administrator, but this deadline may be extended for good cause.
- 6.16 The Court directs the claims administer to send one mailing to the Washington consumers who are eligible for restitution. This mailing will be a letter notifying consumers of their right to restitution pursuant to the direction of the Thurston County Superior Court. This mailing must list a 1-800 telephone number that consumers may call with questions about the restitution process. This mailing must be sent within 70 days of the Court's entry of approval of the claims administrator, but this deadline may be extended for good cause. The mailing must contain the following language:

Pursuant to a judgment entered by the Thurston County Superior Court in the case of the State of Washington vs. LA Investors, LLC, doing business as "Local Records Office" (Thurston County Case Number 13-2-02286-6), please find an enclosed check for \$89. This amount serves as a refund for the amount you paid to Local Records Office in response to a solicitation sent by them that you may have believed originated from the government. This refund was ordered by the Thurston County Superior Court after it determined that the Local Records Office mailer violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act by being deceptive and creating the net impression that it originated from a government agency. If you have questions about this check, please contact [the 1-800 number set up by the claims administrator].

- 6.17 The mailing will contain a check in the amount of \$89 for each consumer who purchased Defendants' product but did not receive a refund. The letter must be on Washington State Attorney General letterhead.
- 6.18 In the event that there are any mailings that are returned as undeliverable due to an incorrect address or for any other reason, the claims administer, within 30 days of such return, shall make all reasonable efforts to locate and contact the consumer, which must include a search of commercial databases for current addresses and/or contact information for the consumer. The claims administrator will mail the mailing to any newly discovered address.
- 6.19 All disbursements distributed by the claims administrator shall be made by check that is valid for 90 days from issuance. The claims administrator shall advise, by mail and email (if available), each consumer to whom such checks were issued if such check has remained uncashed for more than 60 days. The consumer may, if they contact the claims administrator within 45 days thereafter, have a restitution check reissued, which will be valid for 45 days.
- 6.20 The claims administrator shall provide to Defendants and the State a monthly report that provides the following information: (a) the amount of monies paid into and remaining in the Restitution Fund; (b) total amount of refunds paid (including the name and address of each who successfully received a refund); (c) the number of checks cashed by eligible consumers; and (d) the name(s) and addresses of each consumer to whom the mailer was sent and was later returned as undeliverable. The claims administrator shall provide, upon request by the State, all documentation and information necessary for the State to confirm compliance with this Judgment.
- 6.21 In the event that 1) a consumer fails to cash his or her check and fails to contact the claims administrator in accordance with Paragraph 6.19, or 2) the claims administrator, after a good faith attempt, cannot locate a consumer in accordance with Paragraph 6.18, ownership of any consumer's respective \$89 entitlement will revert to Defendants in accordance with Paragraph 6.7.

by the State as detailed in the State's Motion and supporting Declarations were reasonable and appropriate. The Court did not make any upward or downward lodestar adjustment. However, having considered the Parties' respective briefings related to costs and fees, the Court reduced the number of hours requested by Plaintiff for the work of Investigator Mark Porter by 11.7 hours. Such reduction is reflected in the \$157,403.20 referenced above.

- 6.32 The State has incurred costs in the amount of \$19,903.53. The Court finds that the costs detailed in the State's Motion and supporting Declarations were reasonable and necessary for the investigation and litigation of this matter. However, having considered the Parties' respective briefings related to costs and fees, the Court reduced the costs requested by Plaintiff by \$500. Such reduction is reflected in the \$19,903.53 referenced above.
- 6.33 All monies payable to the State pursuant to this Order shall be paid by a check payable to "Attorney General-State of Washington" and sent to the Office of the Attorney General, Attention: Cynthia Lockridge, Administrative Office Manager, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, Washington 98104-3188.

ENFORCEMENT

- 6.34 Violation of any of the injunctions contained in this Judgment, as determined by the Court, shall subject the Defendants to a civil penalty of up to \$25,000.00 per violation pursuant to RCW 19.86.140.
- 6.35 Violation of any of the terms of this Judgment, except for failure to make the monetary payments set out above, as determined by the Court, shall constitute a violation of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020.
- 6.36 This Judgment is entered pursuant to RCW 19.86.080. Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of enabling any party to this Judgment with or without the prior consent of the other party to apply to the Court at any time for enforcement of compliance with this Judgment, to punish violations thereof, or to modify or clarify this Judgment.

1	6.37 Under no circumstances shall this Judgment or the names of the State of
2	Washington or the Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division, or any of its
. 3	employees or representatives be used by Defendants, or Defendants' agents or employees, in
4	connection with the promotion of any product or service or an endorsement or approval of
5	Defendants' practices.
6	6.38 Nothing in this Judgment shall be construed as to limit or bar any other
7	governmental entity or consumer from pursuing other available remedies against Defendants.
8	DISMISSAL AND WAIVER OF CLAIMS
9	6.39 Upon entry of this Judgment, all claims in this matter, not otherwise addressed by
10	this Judgment are dismissed.
11	DATED this 3 day of May, 2016.
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13	THE HONORADIE MARY SHE WILL SON
14	THE HONORABLE MARY SUE WILSON
15	Presented by: Approved for Entry and as to Form, Notice of Presentation Weigen.
16	Notice of Presentation Waived:
17	ROBERT W. FERGUSON BARRETT & GILMAN Attorney General
18	7 3/
19	JOHN A. NELSON, WSBA #45724 THOMAS L. GILMAN, WSBA #8432
20	Assistant Attorney General AMY C. HEVLY, WSBA #23162
21	Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Washington Attorneys for Defendants
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CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN

August 23, 2017 - 3:00 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Supreme Court

Appellate Court Case Number: 94785-6

Appellate Court Case Title: State of Washington v. The Mandatory Poster Agency Inc, et al.

Superior Court Case Number: 14-2-17437-3

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